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Church – State Relations in Europe 
 
By Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe1 
 
 
Academic lawyers frequently distinguish between three models of Church-State 
relations in Europe: State Church Systems, Separation Systems and Hybrid Systems.  
However, the sociologist of religion Grace Davie has suggested that the position of 
religion in Europe can be understood sociologically, historically and legally in terms 
of a basic dichotomy between the northern Protestant State Church systems and the 
southern Catholic separation systems. Furthermore, she contends that the 
constitutional connections between Church and State in European States characterise 
a common ‘European’ approach to religion.  This paper seeks to elucidate the legal 
model and to assess whether Davie’s analysis is preferable in light of the legal 
evidence.  This will enable a tentative conclusion to be made as to the religious 
identity of the continent: is Europe Christian or secular? 
 
In 1945, the continent of Europe had been devastated by six years of warfare.  The 
continent was united in its misery.  Desperate to avoid again the divisions that 
followed the end of the First World War and helped pave the way to a second, the 
European leaders decided to cooperate.  The European integration project was based 
on a steely understanding that the only way a third global conflict could be avoided 
was by international cooperation and an understanding of what Europeans had in 
common.  The boarders of nation states were never to be so rigid again. 
 
The absence of warfare within the continent and the existence of organisations both at 
a European and global level suggest that this strategy has succeeded.  The integration 
project has been wide ranging and all encompassing.  For the sociologist of religion 
Grace Davie (2002), it is possible to articulate a shared European approach to the 
religion and its regulation.  She contends that Europe is an exceptional case: the 
status, role and significance of religion are common throughout the continent and 
distinct from the rest of the world.   
 
For Davie, although precise details differ, the same patterns emerge:  the pattern of an 
“unchurched and residually Christian religion” is “widespread if not universal” in 
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Western Europe (2002, pp.  ix-xi).   Furthermore, this retreat of public religion into 
the background has not been replicated in other continents: “It is simply not the case 
that patterns of religious activity discovered in Western Europe are those of the 
modern world more generally” (2002, p. ix).  Across the globe, in both Christian and 
non-Christian States, religion continues to be a potent force. 
 
The European experience characterised by Christianity can be contrasted with the 
experience of the East.  Whilst the basic unit of human organisation in the West has 
been that of nations subdivided in various ways such as by religion; in contrast, in the 
East, the basic unit is that of the Islamic religion subdivided into nations (Lewis, 
2003).  Although this may be explained historically on the grounds that Middle 
Eastern nation states are relatively new creations, this starting-point remains 
important.  It is difficult to think of a Western equivalent of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference where leaders of more than 57 Muslim countries of all political 
and constitutional descriptions hold regular meetings on the basis of their shared faith 
(Lewis, 2003). 
 
Of course, despite the common historical evidence of a powerful Christian Church 
and the sociological decline of the Church’s public role, there remain significant 
differences within the religious makeup of Europe.  As Davie (2002, p. 11) points out, 
there remains a broad distinction between the Protestant North and the Catholic South 
with a variety of mixed types in between.  Although some countries fail to fit this 
pattern, most notably Catholic Ireland, this north-south distinction rests on a basic 
historical difference which has ongoing sociologically repercussions: the indicators of 
religious activity have fallen faster in the Protestant North than the Catholic South, 
which is perhaps a generation behind (Davie 2002, p. 11).  From a sociological and 
historical perspective, therefore, a common and specifically European trend may be 
identified, albeit one which is more advanced in the north than the south.  
 
The “commonalities of European religion” (Davie 2002, p. 11) are also evident in the 
laws of the European countries.  As Davie recognises, “the constitutional connections 
between Church and State are part of Europe’s history, whether they are retained or 
rejected, applauded or critiqued”; the existence of a constitutional connection between 
Church and State is a “common thread within West Europe” (2002, pp. 2-3, 12).  
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Furthermore, for Davie, the legal evidence follows the broad distinction that may be 
sketched historically and sociologically:  “contrasts lie in the specificities of these 
relationships” and the key distinction is between the Protestant North and the Catholic 
South (2002, p.12-13).2 
 
In Protestant Europe, ecclesiastical arrangements are often in the form of a State 
Church “which embodies, in benign form, national as well as religious identity” 
(Davie 2002, p. 12).  Although indicators of religious activity are relatively low, there 
is little hostility between Church and people.   This arrangement also applies to 
Greece, the sole Orthodox Country, where Greek identity is “virtually 
indistinguishable from Greek orthodoxy” (Davie 2002, p. 13).   
 
In Catholic Europe, by contrast, ecclesiastical arrangements take the form of a 
separation between Church and State, often as a reaction against historic events.  This 
has resulted in more complex Church-State relations: at one end the “extreme case” is 
France, “an impatiently secular State” while at the other end there is noted 
cooperation between State and religious communities (Davie 2002, p. 12).  The 
differences often betray the legacy of the past: for example, the positive role played 
by the Spanish Church in the rebuilding of Spanish democracy and the presence of the 
Holy See in Italy partially explain their ecclesiastical polity. (Davie 2002, p. 13) 
 
However, Davie’s dichotomy distinguishing between Protestant State Church systems 
and Catholic separation systems differs from that employed by most academic 
lawyers (most notably Robbers 2005).  Effectively, they separate the Catholic 
countries into two creating a tripartite distinction between State Church Systems, 
Separation Systems and Hybrid or Cooperation Systems.  One purpose of this article 
is to elucidate this legal distinction and to assess whether Davie’s analysis is 
preferable.  Another purpose is to assess Davie’s proposition that European countries 
share a common religious makeup.  We will examine whether the legal evidence 
supports this hypothesis by looking at the common sources and common 
characteristics of the European States.  This will enable a tentative conclusion to be 
made as to the religious identity of the continent: is Europe Christian or secular?  
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For European lawyers, church-State relations and the legal regulation of religion are 
subsumed under the heading of ‘ecclesiastical law’: that is, State law concerning 
religion.3  This can be contrasted with systems of religious law; that is the laws or 
regulatory instruments made by religious bodies themselves.4 As we have seen, 
European jurists frequently distinguish between three ecclesiastical law models 
(Robbers, 2005 pp.578-580).   These systems are:  
 
(i) State Church Systems  
 
These are characterised by the existence of close links between the State and a 
particular religious community.  These close links have a great significance upon the 
legal position of the religious community and upon religious liberty generally and are 
often defined by constitutional law. The religious community may be styled as a 
‘state’, ‘national’, ‘established’ or ‘folk’ church.   Generally, constitutional links exist 
between the Church and the state executive; the Church and the state legislature; and 
the Church and the people (Sandberg 2006a). Examples of State Church systems 
include England, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Malta, Bulgaria and (historically) 
Sweden.    
 
(ii) Separation Systems  
 
These systems have a strict separation of State and Church.   Such a system is usually 
based upon a constitutional barrier which forbids intervention by the State in the 
affairs of the Church by preventing the financial support and establishment of any one 
religion.  Examples of such a separation are France (with the exception of the three 
Eastern dẽpartements), Netherlands and Ireland.  
 
(iii) Hybrid Systems  
 
Also known as Cooperationist Systems or sometimes Concordatarian Systems, these 
States are characterised by a simple separation of State and Church coupled with the 
recognition of a multitude of common tasks which link State and Church activity.  
While the lack of a State Church and vague references to cooperation can often be 
found in constitutions, the terms of agreements between the State and individual 
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religious groups often take the form of agreements, treaties and Concordats.   
Examples include Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Portugal and 
the Baltic States.  
 
These three models will now be examined in turn.  However, before doing so it 
should be noted that this model focuses upon the constitutional position of religion.  If 
that focus is altered then the limitations of the model are soon evident. For example, 
various means of State funding exist throughout Europe including direct financing of 
religious communities; indirect funding by the allocation of tax revenue or the 
facilitation of a church tax system; and systems that offer minimal financial support.  
These do not coincide neatly with the three ecclesiastical law systems: for example, in 
England, there is minimal financial support whilst in Spain and Italy there is indirect 
support in the form of the allocation of tax revenue.  The question of state funding 
thus serves as an important critique of the current tripartite system. Leaving this point 
aside to focus exclusively upon the constitutional position of religion, we will now see 
assess the merits of the current tripartite distinction by looking in detail at each model.  
 
The State Church model seems the least controversial: it is a mark of distinction used 
both by lawyers and sociologists.  Such systems are distinguished on account of a 
special constitutional position of a certain religious community and special benefits 
and burdens resulting from that special position.  For example, in Denmark, there is a 
high degree of state involvement mainly in the form of control (see, generally, 
Dübeck 1996 and 2006).  Article 4 of the Danish Constitution of 1849, as amended in 
1953, states that “The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Folk Church of 
Denmark, and as such shall be supported by the State”.5  In the words of Dübeck 
(1996, p.41), the Danish National Church is a “state agency for administration” and 
not “a legal organ with autonomy”.  It has no synod, no legal personality and is not a 
corporate body.6  The State Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs determine rules 
concerning membership, the creation of new parishes, and approves the appointment 
and dismissal of clergy who have the status of civil servants.7  Local churches operate 
as State agencies performing different administrative functions for the central 
administration.8  Furthermore, all taxpayers who are members of the national church 
pay a Church tax.9 
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However, other State Church systems in Europe differ substantially from the Danish 
model.  For example, although a state church exists in Greece, the assumption by the 
State of ecclesiastical functions is minimal.  Although Article 3 of the Greek 
Constitution 1975 states that, “The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church of Christ”, the Orthodox Church has its own legal status as a legal 
person: the Article provides that the Orthodox Church is “autocephalous and is 
administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy 
Synod”.10 The Constitution thus guarantees the self-government of the Church.  The 
Holy Synod has administrative, legislative and judicial competence.  Although there 
is some State interest in Church affairs, this is exceptional.11  There is no Church Tax 
but the Greek state has “almost entirely assumed the financing of the prevailing 
religion”.12  
 
The juxtaposition of Church-State relations in Denmark and Greece indicates the 
breadth of the State Church category. Finland provides an alternative contrast in that 
two churches are treated favourably by the State.13  The status of the Finnish 
Evangelical Lutheran Church is analogous to that of the Orthodox Church in Greece; 
while the status of the Orthodox Church, Finland’s second largest religious 
community, is not dissimilar to that of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Denmark.  
A further complication is posed by States where although there was formerly a State 
Church, that legal status has been removed but some special bond still exists.  This 
has occurred in Sweden and Wales.14  It is difficult to place these countries within the 
model: Robbers simply omits them from his categorisation (Robbers, 2005 pp.578-
580). These considerations cast doubt upon the usefulness of the distinction.  
 
A more compelling criticism is that the focus upon the relationship between the State 
and one religious group (or in the case of Finland, two groups) does not paint an 
accurate picture of the legal regulation of religion in those countries.  The existence of 
State Churches has itself prompted concern as to whether they are consistent with 
religious equality and freedom.  For example, Papastathis (1997) has argued that the 
existence of a State Church alongside other religious groups “is bound to generate 
unfair discrimination and abridge religious tolerance”. However, as Ahdar and Leigh 
(2005, pp. 129-130) point out, legal preference for a certain religion is not antithetical 
to religious freedom “at least in its contemporary, milder form”: the two can co-exist 
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as a matter of principle provided that legal preference is not accompanied by distinct 
civil and legal disabilities for the non-adherents of the official religion.  The authors 
thus make the distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ establishment.15  None of the 
European State Church systems constitute a form of ‘strong’ establishment but that in 
itself will not placate critics.  Furthermore, the legal focus upon the State Church 
removes focus away from the position of religious minorities.  If the State Church 
category is to be sustainable, it is imperative that it takes into account the position of 
other faiths.  An analysis of the position of religious minorities in State Church 
systems shows that generally religious groups other than the State Church are treated 
as private organisations but the degree of State involvement differs greatly. Whilst in 
England and Denmark such groups have no special legal status,16 in Finland and 
Sweden there are complex registration requirements.17 Freedom of religious clauses 
are also found in national and international law.  If such equality provisions are seen 
as the main source of law in relation to religion, then characterising these countries on 
the basis that they have a State Church seems outdated.  The State Church 
categorisation often has more to do with the historical theory than sociological reality.   
 
On the surface, separation systems seem to be homogenous in that they are 
characterised by a strict separation of State and Church usually in the form of a 
constitutional prohibition forbidding intervention by the State in religious affairs.  It is 
often thought that such separation systems are characterised by indifference. 
However, although this is a possibility, it is by no means certain: for Ahdar and Leigh, 
separation systems may take two different paths (2005, p. 130).  Separation systems 
may view separation itself as the pre-eminent goal, the desired result; however, it is 
also possible for separation to be used as an important instrumental means towards a 
larger end of protecting religious freedom.  This second path, seeing separation as a 
means of fulfilling religious freedom, requires from the State not indifference but 
positive action to facilitate religious freedom.  Separation requires neutrality from the 
State but this is not a passive obligation: in its pursuit of religious freedom, liberty and 
equality, the State actively seeks to remove all existing boundaries and often seeks to 
provide the means whereby all citizens – regardless of their religious convictions – 
enjoy the equal right to manifest their religiosity throughout their everyday life.   This 
means in practice there is little to distinguish so-called separation systems from the 
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third category.  The only difference is not constitutional relationship but the emphasis 
of the letter of the law.  
 
For example, France is seen as a separation system par excellence: the legacy of the 
historical conflict between ‘clericalism’ (the claim of religion to political domination) 
and ‘anticlericalism’ (the ultimately prevailing counter-claim) is still found in the 
modern law (see Baubérot (2003) and Basdevant-Gaudemet (1996, 2000) Article 2 of 
the French law of 1905 (“The Republic does not recognize, remunerate, or subsidize 
any religious denomination” )18 and Article 1 of the Constitution of 1958 (“France 
shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic”) establish the 
“régime of the neutrality of the state”, a position that can also be described “perhaps 
with a different shade of meaning” as the secular posture, or the laïcité, of the state 
(Basdevant-Gaudemet 1996, p. 123).  However, somewhat ironically, achieving this 
secular posture and ensuring religious freedom and equality requires positive action 
by the State.  Gradually, France has adopted the understanding that the relationship 
requires a ‘positive separation’; a laïcité positive.  As Basdevant-Gaudemet points 
out, “A ‘laïcité positive’ requires frequent intervention in order to bring into being 
everywhere the necessary practical conditions for public worship in respect of each 
religion” (1996: p.123). The Bureau des Cultes of the Ministry of the Interior plays an 
active role in this.  Thus, although no special status is conferred upon a certain 
religion; religious groups are subject to special rules under French law.   Basdevant-
Gaudemet (1996 p.125-129) explains how French law draws a complex distinction 
between Religious Associations,19 Diocesan Associations,20 Charitable and 
Educational Associations,21 Religious Orders,22 and New Religious Movements and 
Sects23  Moreover, as Robert (2003 p.641) points out, the law of separation does not 
outlaw state subsidiaries for activities that have a general character despite having a 
religious setting, such as the administration by public collectives of religious services 
deemed indispensable to ensure freedom and equality of religion and the payment of 
religious minister when they render services to the general public.  Although religious 
groups are mostly funded by private donations, they still enjoy some indirect State 
support, most notably, the State is owner of Catholic places of worship built before 
1905, and it undertakes major works of repair (see Basdevant-Gaudemet 1996, p. 139 
for details). 
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Although the paradoxes of the French system question the usefulness of the separation 
category, it is an examination of Church-State relations in Ireland that illustrates the 
limitations of this category.  For Robbers (2005: 578) Ireland is an example of a 
‘separation system’ because such a separation exists “to a great extent”.  However, 
although the constitution of Ireland spells out fairly precisely the terms of the 
separation of Church and State, it does this by means of an express legal recognition 
of the value of religion.  Article 44(2) of the Constitution currently provides that “The 
State guarantees not to endow any religion” and “shall not impose any disabilities or 
make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status” but 
Article 44(1) states that “The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship 
is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and 
honour religion.”  Although the Constitutional Review Group in 1996 called for 
Article 44.1 to be replaced by the phrase ‘The State guarantees to respect religion” 
this has not been put to the people (Colton 2006 p.97). The interpretation of Article 
44(1) is open to doubt.  Although the Article has been interpreted as underpinning 
Christianity,24 the benefits are not confined to Christians.25  It is “unclear” whether the 
guarantee extends beyond world religions (Casey, 1996 p.152). Furthermore, as Casey 
explains that although the Constitution forbids the endowment of religion, this is not 
equivalent to a ban on establishment (1996, p. 151):26 The only reason why Ireland 
has no State Church is because no religious group has made such a claim.   
 
Like France, Ireland, at the very least, operates a system of positive separation.27  
Indirect financial aid is provided for religious groups.28  Colton contends that Irish 
Church-State relations is actually characterised by the “inextricable interdependence” 
of Church and State (2006 p.101). For Colton, “Education is an area manifestly so 
fertile with Church-State synergy, both historically and administratively, that it dents 
any theory of total separation between the two”.  Primary and secondary education is 
organised predominantly on denominational lines and is extensively supported by 
State funding.  It is difficult to disagree with his conclusion that the relationship 
between Church and State in Ireland “is sufficiently developed and implemented to 
call it an active partnership/ tacit partnership model” (2006, p.111).  This 
interpretation would place Ireland within the hybrid category.  At the very least, such 
a conclusion requires modification of the Separation System category.    
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Whatever the faults of the State Church and Separation categories, these pale into 
insignificance when compared with the final and most contentious category.  Hybrid 
or Cooperationist Systems are characterised by a simple separation of State and 
Church coupled with the recognition of a multitude of common tasks which link State 
and Church activity, usually in the form of an agreement, treaty or Concordat.   
Spain and Italy are seen as the classic examples.  In Spain, Motillia notes that the 
Constitution has led to a system of “constitutionally mandated cooperation” (2004: 
p.574-575): Article 16(3) of the Constitution of 1978 outlines the non-established 
character of all religions: “No religion shall have a state character” and also places a 
duty on public authorities to cooperate with religious communities (see (Rodrĩguez 
Blanco, 2006).  This has been put into practice by the State through the creation of 
Agreements and Concordats which regulate the State’s interactions with the Catholic 
Church and other religions.29  
 
In Italy, Ferrari (1996, p. 171) terms the system “bipartite”: the Constitution aims to 
safeguard liberty and equality of the individual in religious matters whilst 
simultaneously guaranteeing a system of cooperation between the state and religious 
bodies.30Article 7 of the Constitution provides that both the State and the Roman 
Catholic Church are “according to its own order, independent and sovereign” and that 
their “relations are ruled by the Lateran Treaties.” Article 8 provides that all other 
religious denominations “are equally free before the law”. Further, the relations of 
non-Catholic denominations with the state are to be defined “on the basis of 
agreements with their respective representatives”.  Indeed, Ventura notes that non-
covenantal cooperation is not recognised in the Italian constitution and it is difficult 
on an empirical basis to assess the extent to which it is practised (2006, p.125).31 
 
The hybrid category is problematic since it is difficult to distinguish hybrid systems 
from separation systems.  The test cannot simply be the existence of a formal 
agreement.  As Ferrari (1995, p. 421-422) contends the signing of such an agreement 
is not “the definitive element of a state’s attitude towards a church” either politically 
or legally.  He gives the example of the Roman Catholic Church in Belgium where the 
absence of a Concordat has not prevented the Church from enjoying a better legal 
position than it does in some countries where there is a Concordat.  The answer for 
Robbers (2005, p.579) is simply that the existence of a formal agreement is merely a 
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reflection of the cooperationist nature of the system rather than the proof of the 
existence of a Cooperationist System.  This is why Belgium falls into this category.   
 
However, this raises the question of what the definitive element of this type of system 
is.  From Robbers, one may infer that the definitive element is entirely negative: a 
hybrid system is characterised by the lack of both a formal state church and a strict 
system of separation. However, in some cases it is difficult to distinguish hybrid 
countries from State Church systems since there is a clear legal favouring of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Italy, Spain and Belgium.  In all three countries, there 
operates a three-tier distinction between the Roman Catholic Church, other religious 
communities with whom the State has made agreements with and all other religious 
groups with whom no agreement has been made (Martinez-Torrön, 2000 p .49, Ferrari 
1996, p .173, Torfs, 1996, 2006).  In Spain, the Catholic Church it receives direct and 
indirect funding from the State.32  These benefits are generally not received by other 
religious organisations (see Ibán (1996: p.110-111).33  In Italy, there exists two 
systems of finance which benefit not only the Catholic Church but also the other 
denominations who have signed an agreement (Ferrari, 1996).34  In Belgium, although 
six denominations enjoy the status and financial benefits of being a recognised 
religious groups,35 Roman Catholicism is still regarded as “the legally recognised and, 
in real terms, the major religion” (Torfs 2006, p.16).  Therefore, the only distinction 
between Italy, Spain and Belgium as opposed to the State Church system is that the 
constitutional favouring of a particular religious group is provided in a different 
constitutional form.  Church-State relations in Italy, Spain and Belgium clearly favour 
the Roman Catholic Church but do so in terms of agreements as opposed to classical 
establishment.  These Roman Catholic countries seem to favour one religious 
denomination to the same, if not to a greater extent, than the Protestant State Church 
countries.  Perhaps the real distinction is that identified by Davie, focussing on the 
geographical and religious makeup of the countries rather than the source of the legal 
protection.  
 
Distinguishing hybrid systems from the other two categories seems impossible.  
Robbers characterises Germany as a hybrid system on the basis that it “takes a middle 
of the road approach between that of having a State Church and having a strict 
separation between Church and State” (1996, p.60).  However, this is questionable: 
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Monsma and Soper (1997, pp. 11, ) note that “some observers would make the case 
that in Germany there is an informal multiple establishment” and conclude that 
Church-State relations in Germany are characterised by the two basic principles of 
“partnership and autonomy”.  Robbers (1996, p.60) notes somewhat ambiguously that 
Germany State-Church relation are structured around three basic principles: 
“neutrality, tolerance, and parity”. Regardless of the precise terminology used, it is 
difficult to see how these principles characterise a distinct German approach to 
religion.  Surely all European States embody these principles.  It remains unclear what 
in particular is unique about the hybrid systems.   
 
Monsma and Soper (1997, p. 11) adopt the same tripartite distinction to propose three 
models of Church and State at a global level but frame their third model as “the 
pluralist or structural pluralist” model.  This is characterised by the fact that religion is 
seem “not as a separate sphere with only limited relevance to the other spheres as the 
liberal strict separationists so, but as having a bearing on all of life”.  However, this 
rests upon the assumption that separation systems are indifferent towards religion and 
do not facilitate it.  As we have seen, this is incorrect.  There seems nothing to 
exclude France, the Netherlands and Ireland from this model and no definitive and 
distinct element common to the Hybrid systems.  The mere fact that the State 
cooperates with religious groups is not definitive.  Indeed, Doe (2006) contends that it 
is possible not only recognise such cooperation in the United Kingdom but to actually 
conceive of it as an ‘informal’ or ‘quasi concordat’ in a non-technical sense.   For 
Doe, constitutional conventions are ‘informal’ or ‘quasi-concordats’ in substance if 
not in form.  If such cooperation can be found in a State Church system, then surely it 
is characteristic of Europe as a whole rather than simply the hybrid model.  In short, 
the characteristics commonly attributed to hybrid States are invariably characteristics 
common to Europe as a whole and cannot distinguish or justify the existence of 
separate ‘catch-all’ category.  
 
It is thus clear that tripartite distinction traditionally adopted by ecclesiastical lawyers 
that analyses the ecclesiastical polities of European legal systems as being State 
Church Systems, Separation Systems or Hybrid Systems is seriously flawed.  Robbers 
concedes that this classification “according to legal and theoretical considerations is 
constantly overrated and rendered questionable by social circumstance which suggests 
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different groupings” and highlights two problems in particular (1996, pp.324-325) 
First of all, he concedes that the “religious influence on the state in mainly Catholic 
Ireland is probably stronger and more direct than the constitutional provisions 
suggest”; secondly, he notes that some hybrid countries have more in common with 
some State Church countries than other State Church countries do: “there could be a 
closer similarity in the social relevance of religion as between Greece, Spain and Italy 
than would be revealed in a comparison of Greece with Denmark or the United 
Kingdom”.  Both of these points have been elucidated in more depth above: it seems 
that Ireland is not really a separation system and it is difficult to classify those States 
which are commonly placed in the hybrid model.  The three legal categories seem 
overly formulaic.   
 
Having said this, the legal approach has some benefits: as Monsma and Soper (1997, 
p. 10) point out no country embodies any model “in a pure form, but by starting out 
with these models in mind will help to organize and focus the mass of observations” 
that can be made by studying each system.  Furthermore, fears that the expansion of 
the EU to Eastern Europe would undermine the model by introducing a notable 
degree of diversity seem to be misfounded and refuted by the publication of the  
second edition of Robbers’ State and Church in the European Union.  Further, 
Schanda’s account of Church-State relations in Eastern Europe rests firmly upon the 
framework provided by the tripartite distinction (2005).  
 
However, the usefulness of the distinctions currently employed by ecclesiastical 
lawyers remains questionable for a variety of reasons elucidated above.  Further, 
although the problematic third category may suggest that ecclesiastical lawyers should 
follow Davie in adopting a broad contrast between northern Protestant State Church 
systems and southern Roman Catholic separation systems, it has also been shown that 
these categories too are disputed.  State Church Systems vary to a great extent and the 
classification ignores the legal regulation of other religious groups whilst it is open to 
debate as to whether any European country operates a separation system where the 
characteristics of the hybrid systems are completely absent.  This means that it is 
difficult to provide wholehearted support to Davie’s dichotomy.    
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Ferrari (1997) advocates that the tripartite system should be abandoned.  He laments 
what he perceives to be the “persistent recourse (to a large extent due to mental 
laziness) to an outmoded classification” that “grants excessive importance the formal 
element of the relationship between church and state” which “overlooks its legal 
substance” (1997, p. 78).   By focussing upon the “legal substance”, it is possible to 
provide legal evidence for Davie’s broader point.  Identifying common legal sources 
as well as the resulting common legal characteristics permits conclusions to be made 
not only in relation to what extent Western Europe shares a common legal position of 
religion but what common conception of religion Western Europe shares.   
 
Although Church-State relations in different European States show a degree of 
diversity which itself “mirrors the diversity of the national cultures and identities” , 
the different systems nevertheless “have common roots in the basic experiences of 
shared history” (Robbers 1996,  p. 323).  They also share common sources of law.  
All are members of the European Union which entails acceptance of the supremacy of 
European Union law, which guarantees religious diversity and outlaws discrimination 
on grounds of religion.36  Moreover, all States are signatories of various international 
treaties, most notably human rights guarantees.  All members of the EU are 
signatories to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), a human rights 
treaty that originates not from the EU but from the Council of Europe.   Article 9 of 
the ECHR guarantees an absolute right to hold or change one’s religion and belief and 
a qualified right to manifest religion or belief (see Evans 2002). 
 
Common characteristics of a European legal approach to religion can also be 
identified.  Ironically, under this approach, the third legal category of hybrid systems 
becomes the answer rather than the problem since writings on these systems illustrate 
common characteristics which are shared not only be the so-called hybrid systems but 
by the States of Europe in general. It seems that the European approach is 
characterised by the recognition of religious freedom and the autonomy of religious 
organisations.  Cooperation exists between the State and at least some religious 
groups and such partnerships may be formulated as being an ‘informal’ or ‘quasi-
concordatian’ in substance if not in form (Doe, 2006).  A basic level of neutrality, 
tolerance, and parity is common to the whole continent.  No country has a ‘strong’ 
State Church system where other religious groups are not tolerated (Ahdar and Leigh 
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2005, pp. 129-130) and no country has a ‘strong’ separation system whereby the State 
is indifferent to religion and religious liberty.  
 
Ferrari (1997, pp. 77-79) suggests that a common model of the relationship between 
the State and religious faiths has existed in Western Europe may be defined by 
reference to three characteristics: firstly, the State is “neutral towards the various 
individual religious subjects”; secondly, a  “religious sub-sector is singled out within 
the public escort” as a “playing field” or “protected area” in which religious subjects 
are “free to act in conditions of substantial advantage compared to those collective 
subjects that are not religious”; and thirdly, the State “has the right to intervene in this 
area only to see that the players respect the rules of the game and the boundaries of 
the playing field”.  However, he notes that this model is now “outmoded” since it 
embodies “a specific vision of the world that is unable to include the variety of 
existing experiences” (1997, pp.77, 84, 88).   
 
Nevertheless, the basics of this common model may be used to understand and 
elucidate a common European approach to religion in the twenty-first century.  As 
Ferrari points out, the position of States in relation to religion is invariably 
characterised by neutrality as the State is obliged not only to endorse but also to 
facilitate religious equality and pluralism.37  As Rivers (2004) has noted, the apparent 
neutrality is nothing of the sort but is rather “an expression of regionally specific post-
Christian religiosity”.  This accords well with the sociological evidence put forward 
by Davie (2002) of a continent which is “unchurched” but shares a “residually 
Christian religion”.  It also needs to be understood against the background of the 
current post-9/11 climate where the divisive role of religion is emphasised and where 
States finds the loyalty of the individual towards religion troubling in terms of 
security and national identity.  
 
For Sandberg (forthcoming), the position of the previously dominant Christian 
religion in Europe can be understood as a form of “banal religiosity”.  Europe is no 
longer Christian, nor is it secular.  Instead, in the public sphere Christianity simply 
serves as a vague moral source of identity.  Building upon Billig’s concept of “banal 
nationalism” (1995), “banal religiosity” may be seen as being constantly perpetuated 
by everyday habits. It is a civic religion based upon basic ethical principles 
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traditionally aligned with religious traditions which has grown as a response to 
religious difference. In the same way that banal nationalism can be contrasted with 
“hot nationalism” which occurs at time of “social disruption”, banal religiosity can be 
contrasted with fundamental religiosity. In an age where the “otherness” of different 
religious traditions is stressed, Europeans seem to cling to what Davie describes as a 
“residually Christian religion”.   It is clear that the European integration project has 
led to a common approach to religion.  Further work is needed to elucidate this 
common approach.   However, although it seems that this approach is predicated upon 
neutrality, closer analysis needs to be paid to this claim since a specific view and 
conception of religion may remain influential. 
 
RUSSELL SANDBERG is an associate tutor at Cardiff Law School, a Research 
Associate of the Centre for Law and Religion and a Doctoral Associate of the Centre 
for Islam in the UK, Cardiff University.  After graduating from the Law School with 
First Class Honours in July 2005, he commenced doctoral study at Cardiff University, 
entitled 'Religion, Society and Law: An Analysis of the Interface between the Law on 
Religion and the Sociology of Religion'.  He has written widely on religion and 
human rights, discrimination law, Church State relations, law and morality and 
religious law and has had work published in a range of journals in a number of 
different disciplines, including Public Law, the Ecclesiastical Law Journal, Sewanee 
Theological Review, Sociology and a number of European periodicals. 
 
NORMAN DOE is a Professor and the Director of the Centre for Law and Religion, 
Cardiff Law School.  He studied law at Cardiff, a masters degree in theology at 
Oxford, and, for his doctorate, at Cambridge.  He is an associate professor at the 
University of Paris, a member of the European Consortium for Church and State 
Research, and is author of Fundamental Authority in Late Medieval English Law 
(Cambridge, 1990), The Legal Framework of the Church of England (Oxford, 1996), 
Canon law in the Anglican Communion (Oxford, 1998), and The Law of the Church 
in Wales (Cardiff, 2002), editor of Essays in Canon Law (Cardiff, 1992) and co-
editor, with Mark Hill and Robert Ombres OP, of English Canon Law (Cardiff, 1998). 
He is a member of the general committee of the Ecclesiastical Law Society and was a 
member of the Lambeth Commission (2004). 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Ahdar, R, and Leigh, I, 2005, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, Oxford 
Universe Press, Oxford 
 
Basdevant-Gaudemet, B, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in France’ in Robbers, G, 
State and Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Basdevant-Gaudemet, B, 2000, ‘The Legal Status of Islam in France’ in Ferrari, S and 
Bradney, A  (eds) Islam and European Legal Systems, Ashgate, Aldershot  
 
17 
 
Post-Print of an article subsequently published in: (2007) 1 (5) Religion Compass 561-578. 
Baubérot, J, 2003, ‘Secularism and French Religious Liberty: A Sociological and 
Historical View’ [2003] Brigham Young University Law Review 451 
 
Billig, M, 1995, Banal Nationalism, Sage, Oxford  
 
Casey, J, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in Ireland’ in Robbers, G, State and Church 
in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Colton, P, 2006, ‘Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal 
Cooperation of State and Religions in Ireland’ in Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion 
and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State 
and Religion in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Cranmer, F, 2000, ‘The Church of Sweden and the Unravelling of Establishment’ 5 
(27) Ecclesiastical Law Journal  417 
 
Davie, G, 2002, Europe: the Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern 
World, Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd  
 
Doe, N, 1992, (ed) Essays in Canon Law – A Study of the Church in Wales, 
University of Wales Press, Cardiff 
 
Doe, N, 1996, The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Clarendon, Oxford 
 
Doe, N, 2002, The Law of the Church in Wales, University of Wales Press, Cardiff 
 
Doe, N, 2004, (ed), The Portrayal of Religion in Europe: the Media and the Arts, 
Peeters, Leuven 
 
Doe, N, 2006, ‘The Concordat Concept as Constitutional Convention in Church-State 
Relations in the United Kingdom’ in Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion and Law in 
Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion 
in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Doe, N, (Forthcoming) ‘Modern Church Law’ in Witte, J (ed) Cambridge Companion 
to Law and Religion  
 
Dübeck, I, 1996/2005 ‘State and Church in Denmark’ in Robbers, G, State and 
Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Dübeck, I, 2006, ‘Non-Covenantal Cooperation of State and Religion in Denmark’ in 
Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-
Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Evans, C., 2002, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford  
 
Ferrari, S, 1995, ‘The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe: The 
Italian Model’ [1995] Brigham Young University Law Review 421. 
 
18 
 
Post-Print of an article subsequently published in: (2007) 1 (5) Religion Compass 561-578. 
Ferrari, S, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in Italy’ in Robbers, G, State and Church in 
the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Ferrari, S, 1997, ‘The New Wine and the Old Cask.  Tolerance, Religion and the Law 
in Contemporary Europe’ 10:1 Ratio Juris 75, p.78  
 
Ferrari, S and Bradney, A (eds) Islam and European Legal Systems, Ashgate, 
Aldershot  
 
Friedner, L, 1996 /2005 ‘State and Church in Sweden’ in Robbers, G, State and 
Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Friedner, L, 2006, ‘Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation of State and 
Religion in Sweden’ in Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion and Law in Dialogue: 
Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe, 
Peeters, Leuven 
 
Heikkilä, M, Knuutila, J & and Scheinin, M,  1996/2005, ‘State and Church in 
Finland’ in Robbers, G, State and Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, 
Germany   
 
Huxley, A, 2002 (ed), Religion, Law and Tradition: Comparative Studies in Religious 
Law, Routledge, London 
 
Ibán, I, 1996/2005,  ‘State and Church in Spain’ in Robbers, G, State and Church in 
the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Kotianta, M, ‘The Legal Position of Religion and the Media in Finland’ in Doe, N, 
2004, (ed), The Portrayal of Religion in Europe: the Media and the Arts, Peeters, 
Leuven 
 
Lewis, B, 2003, The Crisis of Islam, Phoenix, London 
 
Martinez-Torrön, J, 2000, ‘The Legal Status of Islam in Spain’ in Ferrari, S and 
Bradney, A (eds) Islam and European Legal Systems, Ashgate, Aldershot  
 
Motillia, A, 2004, ‘Religious Pluralism in Spain: Striking the Balance Between 
Religious Freedom and Constitutional Rights’ [2004] Brigham Young University Law 
Review 575 
 
Monsma, SV & Soper, JC, 1997, The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in 
Five Democracies, Rowman & Littlefield, New York 
 
Oliva, JG, 2005, ‘The Catholic Church and the Socialist Government in Spain: 
Irreconcilable Differences?’ 8 (37) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 199  
 
Oliva, JG and Alberca de Castro, JA, 2004, ‘Sociology, law and religion in Italy and 
Spain’ 153 Law and Justice, 44-67  
 
19 
 
Post-Print of an article subsequently published in: (2007) 1 (5) Religion Compass 561-578. 
Papastathis, P, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in Greece’ in Robbers, G, State and 
Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Papastathis, P, 1997, ‘Tolerance and Law in Countries with an Established Church’ 
10:1 Ratio Jurist 108  
 
Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-
Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Rivers, J, 2004, ‘In pursuit of pluralism: the ecclesiastical policy of the European 
Union’, 7 (34) Ecclesiastical Law Journal  267 
 
Robbers, G, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in the European Union’ in Robbers, G, 
State and Church in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
  
Robert, J, 2003, Religious Liberty and French Secularism’ [2003] Brigham Young 
University Law Review 637 
 
Rodrĩguez Blanco, M, 2006, ‘Religion and Law in Dialogue: The Covenantal and 
Non-Covenantal Cooperation of State and Religions in Spanish Law’ in Puza, R and 
Doe, N (eds), Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal 
Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Sandberg, R, 2006a,  ‘The Legal Status of Religious Denominations and State-Church 
Relations in the UK’ in Droit des Religions en France et en Europe: recueil de 
Textes, Bruxelles, Bruylant) 
 
Sandberg, R, 2006b, ‘A Whitehall Farce? Defining and Conceptualising the British 
Civil Service’ [2006] Public Law 653 
 
Sandberg, R, forthcoming, ‘Religion, Society and Law: An Analysis of the Interface 
Between Law on Religion and the Sociology of Religion’, Doctoral thesis, Cardiff 
University 
 
Schanda, B, 2005 ‘Church and State in Eastern Europe’ 8 (37) Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 186  
 
Torfs, R, 1996/2005, ‘State and Church in Belgium’ in Robbers, G, State and Church 
in the European Union, Baden Baden, Germany   
 
Torfs, R, 2000, ‘The Legal Status of Islam in Belgium’ in Ferrari, S and Bradney, A 
(eds) Islam and European Legal Systems, Ashgate, Aldershot  
 
Ventura, M, ‘Religion and Law in Dialogue: The Covenantal and Non-Covenantal 
Cooperation of State and Religions in Italy’ in Puza, R and Doe, N (eds), Religion and 
Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State and 
Religion in Europe, Peeters, Leuven 
 
Watkin, TG, 1990, ‘The Vestiges of Establishment’ 2 Ecclesiastical Law Review 110 
 
20 
 
Post-Print of an article subsequently published in: (2007) 1 (5) Religion Compass 561-578. 
Watkin, TG, 1992, ‘Disestablishment, Self-determination and the Constitutional 
Development of the Church in Wales’ in Doe N (ed) Essays in Canon Law – A Study 
of the Church in Wales, University of Wales Press, Cardiff  
 
                                                 
1
 Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University, UK.  http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr 
 
2
 It should be noted that Davie’s analysis was written before the recent expansion of the EU to include 
the former Communist States.  These are discussed by Schanda (2005).   
 
3
 See Doe (1996)  p. 13-15 for a fuller elucidation including the narrower English interpretation of this 
term 
 
4
 On which see, for example, Huxley (2002)  and Doe, (forthcoming). 
 
5
 This “legally prescribed inter-relationship” (Dübeck 1996, p. 39) is further buttressed by Article 6, 
which states that “The King shall be a member of the Evangelical Lutheran Church”. 
 
6
 It has no written constitution.  Although Article 66 states that, “The constitution of the Established 
Church shall be laid down by statute”, no written constitutional Statute has actually been written 
despite several commissions.  Dübeck contends that Article 66 has been interpreted as providing that 
‘the conditions of the National Church shall be regulated by law’ (1996, p.38)  
 
7
 The clergy of the church have the legal status of civil servants and are normally appointed in 
accordance with Danish civil service legislation (Dübeck 1996, p. 50).  (See Sandberg 2006b for a 
discussion of the status of clergy as civil servants). Danish law also obliges the state through the 
Ministry of Finance to pay clergy salaries and pensions.  The law confers on church authorities only the 
right to negotiate salaries and for clerics to form Trade Unions for this purpose.   The law denies the 
clergy a right to strike.    Priests enjoy full civil liberties of the Danish constitution and the ECHR, with 
the exception that their freedom of expression is limited by ‘freedom of confession’; their right to 
preach the gospel  (Dübeck 1996, p.53) 
 
8
 Since 1903, all members of the Danish National Church over the age of 18 are eligible to vote and 
stand for election to Parochial Church Councils.   For Dübeck, the parishes “are the fundamental, 
democratic unit of the Danish National Church”,; laymen at parish level have a central position in 
relation to the administration and use of churches and church grounds as well as the election of 
Bishops” (Dübeck 1996, p.38).   
 
9
 The National Church is also funded by State aid under Article 4 and by the Common Fund for the 
maintenance and restoration of churches, historic furnishings and monuments. 
10
 As Papastathis explains, Orthodox churches may either be autocephalous or autonomous: “A church 
is autocephalous when it is spiritually self-sufficient and independent in administration.  It is 
autonomous when it is only impendent in administration” (1996: p.78).  
 
11
 Article 33 states that the President on taking office must take a Christian oath “in the name of the 
Holy and consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity”.  Under Article 59 a similar oath is required of 
Members of Parliament but that Article also provides that “Members of Parliament who are of a 
different religion or creed shall take the same oath according to the form of their own religion or 
creed”. General questions concerning Churches and parishes are determined by a metropolitan Council, 
consisting of a Judge, an official from the Ministry of Finance, two priests and a parish council.  
Official records on the election of archbishops and metropolitan are submitted to the Minister of 
Education and Cults who orders the publication of a presidential decree; following that, the elected 
prelate submits his confirmation to the President and assumes his duties (Papastathis 1996, p. 86) 
 
12
 This direct funding takes a number of forms such as grants, the payment of salaries, tax exemption 
and rights under property law, see Papastathis (1996,  p.87) 
 
13
 For details see Heikkilä, J Knuutila and M Scheinin (2005) and Kotianta (2004) 
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14
 In Sweden, the relevant legislation is the Religious Communities Act 1998 and the Church of 
Sweden Act 1998, on which see Cranmer (2000) and Friedner (2005, 2006).  In Wales, the relabtn 
legislation is Welsh Church Act 1914, Welsh Church (Temporalities) Act 1919, Welsh Church (Burial 
Grounds) Act 1945, on which see Doe (1992, 2002) and Watkin (1990, 1992). 
 
15
 A similar distinction has been purported by bodies seeking to enforce international human rights 
guarantees.    
 
16
 In England, since the toleration legislation of the seventeenth century, religious groups other than the 
Church of England have been lawful.  They are usually treated as voluntary associations whose 
members are bound together as part of a private agreement.  Civil courts will uphold the internal rules 
of the association upon assenting members but will generally only interfere to protect a civil right or to 
administer property (Forbes v Eden (1867) LR Sc & Div 568)   In Denmark, dissenting religious 
communities are seen legally as independent autonomous, private institutions.  Although they have no 
special legal status, they have special connections with different public authorities: for example, the 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs has the capacity to decide questions about the authorization of 
marriages (Dübeck 2006, p. 43). 
 
17
 In Finland, all other religious communities – other than the Lutheran and the Orthodox Churches – 
are private law subjects which operate under the Freedom of Religion Act 2003.  Once they met the 
detailed requirements, they may be registered by the National Board of Patents and Registration and 
can enjoy full legal capacity as autonomous juridical persons and members are not personally 
responsible for their debts.   In Sweden, all religious communities are now subject to the Religious 
Communities Act 1998, which provides a registration scheme whereby religious communities can be 
recognised by law as a legal personality.  Friedner notes that forty groups have registered so far, 
including the Roman Catholic Church, some Muslim organisations and a denomination dedicated to the 
old Nordic heathen gods (2005, p.544).  However, a registration application from the Swedish 
Humanist Association has been refused since the statutory definition of a religious community has not 
been met (Friedner 2006, p.540). 
 
18
 This law does not apply to the three Eastern dẽpartements, namely Huat-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and 
Moselle, which were under German rule until 1918.  The following thus relates to France with the 
exception of the three Eastern dẽpartements 
 
19
 The Law of 1905 provided for the formation of ‘Religious Associations’ which would be capable of 
receiving the property of the former public church establishments which disappeared in 1905.   In 
addition to meeting the requirements of the law on associations, religious associations must comply 
with additional rules, including the requirement that they be “exclusively for the purpose of the 
Church”.  ‘Religious Associations’ have benefited from advantages in taxation law.  Ownership of 
church buildings is bestowed in the Religious Association.  The State courts have deemed themselves 
competent to resolve the matter of defining what constitutes a ‘church’. 
 
20
 The Catholic Church refuses to use the Law of 1905, mainly due to the fear of the emergence of a 
multitude of different associations outside the mainstream of the Church.  Consequentially, a Law of 
1907 provided that an association could advance the public exercise of religion without being a 
‘Religious Association’.  The Roman Catholic Church was thus able to set up ‘Diocesan Associations’, 
following the rules of Canon law and being “in communion with the Holy Sea and in conformity with 
the constitution of the Catholic Church”.  The Laws of 1907 and 1908 transferred ownership 
responsibilities of existing Catholic Church buildings to the State.  Since 1924, the construction and 
ownership of new places of worship rests with the diocesan association.    
 
21
 These are other associations who work in liaison with religious authorities but do not have 
exclusively religious purposes have relied upon the freedom of association provided by the law of 
1901.  Muslims have used this legal form to establish Islamic schools, for example.   
 
22
 From 1942, the offence of being an ‘illicit order’ was abolished; religious orders thus existed as de 
facto groups without legal existence or personality.  A judicial decree could provide legal recognition 
and confer legal capacity.  Such orders are subject to a form of trustee supervision on the part of the 
State. 
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23
 French courts have refused to define some new religious movements as religions or sects.  Although 
such groups have the legal right to exist (provided that they are not contrary to law, good morals or 
public policy), their legal position is ambiguous. 
 
24
 Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36. 
 
25
 In Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [1999] 4 IR 484, Barrington J held that: “[The] 
State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God.  It promises to hold his 
name in reverence and to respect and honour religion.  At the same time it guarantees freedom of 
conscience, the free profession and practice of religion and equality before the law to all citizens, be 
they Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, agnostics or atheists”. 
 
26
 Although he contends that, Article 44(2) precludes giving any legal privileges to the members of an 
established church that is denied to others.   
 
27
 In Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [1999] 4 IR 484, Barrington J held that “Article 
44.1 goes further and places the duty on the State to respect and honour religion as such.  At the same 
time the State is not placed in the position of an arbiter of religious truth.  Its only function is to protect 
public order and morality”. The way in which the State facilitates religion is shown in the decision in 
Flynn v Power and Sisters of the Holy Faith [1985] IR 648 that it was lawful for a religious 
organisation to require higher standards from their employees than that which apply to average 
employees.   
 
28
 Although state support is minimal, indirect aid is existent.  For example, exemption from local rates 
is given to “…any church, chapel or other building exclusively dedicated to religious worship” under 
the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act 1838.  Further, although remuneration paid to ministers of religion, from 
whatever source, is liable to income tax (Dolan v K [1944] IR 470), income received by a church, 
religious order or religious group as a result of a gift or bequest which qualifies as charitable is exempt 
from taxation.   
 
29
 See Iban (2005) for details.  As Oliva and Alberca de Castro (2004) have noted that here are 
important differences between the Catholic treaties and the treaties concerning other religious groups.  
Further, Oliva (2005) has documented how the Socialist government elected in 2004 has been 
“perceived as opposed to co-operation” with the Catholic Church in relation to the teaching of Catholic 
education in state schools and same sex marriages”. 
 
30
 Religious freedom and equality is safeguarded by Articles 3 and 19 of the Constitution.  Article 3 of 
the Constitution states that all citizens are “equal before the law, regardless of … religion”.  Article 19 
bestows the right upon every person to “profess faith freely” and to “exercise worship in public or 
private, provided that the rites involved do not offend common decency”.   Furthermore, Italian law 
permits conscientious objection to military service and the right of medical employees to refuse to 
participate to abortion.    
 
31
 That said, some legal provisions permit and encourage such cooperation: this would include the right 
for individuals and social groups to express their personality under Article 2 and laws that protect the 
cultural and artistic heritage. 
 
32
 The system is governed by very detailed legislation: put simply, in his tax return the taxpayer can 
state whether a percentage of the sum he has to pay to the State is to go to: either the Catholic Church, 
or social purposes, or both, or to the general budget of the State. The Catholic Church also received 
indirect funding: the State pays the wages of teachers of Catholic religious education and of Catholic 
clergy working in the armed forces and prisons.  Further, funds are provided for its social activities in 
relation to hospitals, schools and charity work.  
 
33
 However, the registered confessions with who a Treaty has been concluded share a tax privilege in 
relation to donations with the Roman Catholic Church: 10% of the sum given is deducted from the 
income tax of the donor.   Further, certain tax exemptions are enjoyed for religious activities.   
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 The first allows a quota of an individual’s income tax paid to the State to be designated by the 
taxpayer to one of three beneficiaries: the Italian State, for extraordinary measures against famine in 
the world,   natural disasters, aid to refugees, the conservation of cultural monuments; the Catholic 
Church, for the support of worship, the support of clergy, and for the churches welfare measures 
benefiting the national community or third world countries; or one of the denominations which have 
signed an agreement with the State. If a person does not make the declaration, the quota is distributed 
amongst these different classes in proportion to the choice made by the rest of the population liable to 
income tax. The second type of financing is the right of the religious denominations to off-set 
donations to religious organisations from taxable income.  Other forms of indirect funding include tax 
advantages such as exemption from land transfer tax and inheritance tax.  Further, any property of the 
Holy See located on Italian territory is exempt form any kind of tax or duty toward the State or public 
entities (See Ferrari 1996: p.181-184). 
 
35
 Namely: Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Anglicanism, Islam and the (Greek and Russian) 
Orthodox Church. 
 
36
 Respect for national diversity is enshrined into the structure of the EU treaties; in relation to religious 
diversity, the appendix to the Treaty of Amsterdam entitled ‘Declaration on the Status of Churches and 
Non-confessional Organisations’ provides that:  “The European Union respects and does not prejudice 
the status under national laws of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member 
States.  The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations.” Directive 2000/78/EC states that discrimination on grounds of sex, race, sexual 
orientation, age, disability and religion or belief “should be prohibited throughout the Community”.  
For further details, see Rivers (2004). 
 
37
 The European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg has recognised that, “The State’s role as the 
neutral and impartial organiser of the practising of various religions, denominations and beliefs is 
conducive to religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society”: Refah Partsi v Turkey 
(41340/98) (31 July 2001). 
 
